Should Latin American countries adopt structural balance-based fiscal rules? by Ter-Minassian, Teresa
Revista de Economía y Estadística - Vol. XLIX, N° 1 (2011) - pp. 115-143
Instituto de Economía y Finanzas - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba – Argentina
Should Latin American countries adopt 
structural balance-based fi scal rules?
Tൾඋൾඌൺ Tൾඋ-Mංඇൺඌඌංൺඇ*
Senior Consultant, Inter American Development Bank
tterminassian@yahoo.com
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Latin America has a long history of pro-cyclical fiscal policies, reflecting 
the region’s exposure to a range of exogenous shocks, tight financial 
constraints and relatively weak fiscal institutions. This paper discusses 
the role that structural balance-based fiscal rules (SFRs) could play in 
moderating pro-cyclicality, ensuring longer-term debt sustainability, 
and facilitating the coordination of fiscal with other macro-economic 
policies in the region. It also focuses on the necessary ingredients for a 
sound design and successful implementation of SFRs. The fact that these 
conditions are rather demanding, and unlikely to be adequately fulfilled 
in many Latin America countries at the present time, suggests that a gra-
dualist approach may be more realistic, beginning with a systematic and 
transparent calculation and dissemination by the authorities of structu-
ral indicators to assess the fiscal stance and inform budgetary policy, 
and moving to more formal rules over time as the relevant pre-conditions 
are put in place.
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Rൾඌඎආൾඇ 
América Latina posee una larga historia de políticas fi scales procíclicas lo 
cual refl eja la exposición de la región a shocks exógenos, fuertes restriccio-
nes fi nancieras e instituciones fi scales relativamente débiles. Este artículo 
discute el rol que las reglas fi scales basadas en equilibrios presupuestarios 
estructurales (SFRs) pueden tener para moderar la prociclicidad, asegurar 
la sostenibilidad de la deuda en el largo plazo, y facilitar la coordinación 
de la  política fi scal con otras políticas macroeconómicas en la región. 
El artículo también se enfoca en las condiciones necesarios para un buen 
diseño y la exitosa implementación de las SFRs. El hecho de que estas 
condiciones son bastante rigurosas e improbables de encontrar en muchos 
países de la región en la actualidad, sugiere que un enfoque gradualista 
podría ser más realista, comenzando por la construcción y diseminación 
sistemática y transparente de indicadores estructurales para medir la si-
tuación fi scal e informar la política presupuestaria, para luego moverse a 
reglas más formales cuando las condiciones relevantes estén  establecidas.
Palabras clave: Reglas Fiscales, América Latina, Política Fiscal Estructural, 
Prociclicidad.
Código JEL:  E62, H60.
I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ ൺඇൽ ඈඏൾඋඏංൾඐ
As well documented in the literature1, Latin America (henceforth 
LA) has a long history of pro-cyclical fi scal policies, refl ecting the region’s 
exposure to a range of exogenous shocks, tight fi nancial constraints and
relatively weak fi scal institutions. Pro-cyclicality declined during the last decade,
as most countries saved part of the fi scal dividends of stronger growth and 
high commodity prices. The resulting improvement in fi scal balances and 
debt positions allowed most of the region to accommodate the decline in 
revenues induced by the global fi nancial crisis of 2008-09, and in a number 
of cases to fi nance active counter-cyclical fi scal expansions. However, fi scal 
policies remained largely expansionary in 2010, despite a rapid recovery of 
output and emerging signs of overheating in some countries.
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1. Among the many studies that have documented fi scal pro-cyclicality in LA, see e.g. Perry et al.,
(2008); and Daude et al., (2010).
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Against this background, this paper discusses the role that structural 
balance-based fi scal rules (SFRs) could play in moderating pro-cyclicality, 
ensuring longer-term debt sustainability, and facilitating the coordination of 
fi scal with other macro-economic policies in the LA region. It also focuses on 
the necessary ingredients for a sound design and successful implementation 
of SFRs. The fact that these conditions are rather demanding, and unlikely to 
be adequately fulfi lled in many LA countries at the present time, suggests that 
a gradualist approach may be more realistic in these countries, beginning with
a systematic and transparent calculation and dissemination by the authorities of
structural indicators to assess the fi scal stance and inform budgetary policy, and 
moving to more formal rules over time as the relevant pre-conditions are put in place.
The paper begins with a discussion of pro’s and con’s for SFRs in the 
LA context (sect. II); it then discusses various issues in their design (sect. III) 
and implementation (sect. IV), including their applicability at the sub-national 
level (sect. V).  Sect. VI reviews the experience of Chile with its SFR; and 
briefl y discusses the recently enacted SFR for Colombia, and whether a 
SFR would be appropriate for Brazil, where reportedly it is currently under 
consideration. Sect.VII presents some concluding thoughts.
II. Pඋඈ'ඌ ൺඇൽ ർඈඇ'ඌ ඈൿ ඌඍඋඎർඍඎඋൺඅ ൿංඌർൺඅ උඎඅൾඌ
ංඇ ඍඁൾ Lൺඍංඇ Aආൾඋංർൺ ർඈඇඍൾඑඍ
Pro-cyclical fi scal responses to recurring external shocks -such as sudden
stops in capital infl ows, and boom and bust cycles in commodity prices, that 
were so endemic in LA during the “lost decade” of the 1980s and in the1990s-
entailed a range of costs for the region:
● They aggravated macro-economic volatility, with adverse effects on
employment, business climate, and FDI
● They frequently included cutbacks in social programs during periods
of rising unemployment and poverty
● They also involved cuts or postponements in planned public investments 
during crises, contributing to persisting large infrastructure 
gaps; or sprees on ineffi cient spending (“white elephants” or 
overmanned civil services) during booms; and fi nally,
● Due to asymmetric responses (stronger expansions than retrenchments)
over the cycle, they undermined debt sustainability in some of 
the countries. 
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Fiscal pro-cyclicality during those decades refl ected a range of 
factors, in particular the tightness of fi nancing constraints during adverse 
shocks; and political and social pressures linked to the democratization pro-
cess, as well as weaknesses in the institutional frameworks for fi scal policy 
and management, during “good times”.
The fi rst decade of the 2000s saw a signifi cant progress in fi scal 
management throughout the region, as most countries took advantage of 
stronger revenues to reduce the public debt, improve its structure, and/or 
accumulate assets. As a result, pro-cyclicality was substantially reduced (albeit 
not eliminated in most countries), and several were able to respond to the 
global fi nancial crisis of 2008-09 with substantial fi scal stimulus packages. 
However, fi scal policy remained expansionary in most countries in 
2010, despite the recovery in activity and the emergence of initial signs of 
overheating and rising infl ationary pressures in some of them. Moreover, 
although public debt levels in LA are on average much lower than in advanced 
countries, it is unclear how much capital markets’ debt tolerance for the region
has increased in recent years. Thus, a timely tightening of fi scal policies 
would contribute to promoting both near term macro-economic stabilization 
and longer-term fi scal sustainability.
Against  this background, the adoption of  well designed and effectively 
implemented fi scal rules targeting a structural balance (adjusted for the cycle 
and, in countries highly dependent on commodity revenues, for deviation of 
the relevant commodity prices from their medium term trend) would help LA 
countries avoid pro-cyclicality and the attendant macroeconomic, effi ciency 
and social costs discussed above. It would also facilitate better coordination of 
monetary and fi scal policies, reducing the upward pressures on interest rates 
and exchange rates that are currently evident in many countries  of the region 
(especially Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico).
However, as the subsequent sections of this paper will argue in more 
detail, a sound design and an effective implementation of SFRs are no easy 
tasks, and require a number of demanding political, institutional, as well as 
economic, pre-conditions, which are only partially (and to varying degrees) 
met in most countries of the region. 
Moreover, while a SFR is superior to a rule targeting an unadjusted 
budget balance in preventing fi scal pro-cyclicality, it shares with the latter 
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the risk of hindering active counter-cyclical fi scal responses to a crisis , even 
when there exists adequatefi scal space for such responses. Even during boom 
periods, a SFR may constitute a hindrance to a needed fi scal tightening, if it 
lulls a government into believing that, by meeting the SFR’s target, it has done 
all it needs to do on the fi scal front to stabilize the economy.
There are a number of possible approaches to combining the benefi ts of 
constraining discretion through a SFR with those of maintaining an adequate 
degree of fl exibility inmacro-fi scal management:
i) The SFR may include escape clauses to deal with unpredictable exogenous
shocks. Such clauses should specify as clearly as possible the nature 
and magnitude of the shocks to be accommodated; the length of the 
period during which the rule would be relaxed or put into abeyance; 
a path of return to full observance of the rule; and the responsibility
for activating the clause and monitoring its implementation. This 
specifi cation requires careful consideration of country-specifi c circum-
stances, such as the type of shocks the country is most exposed to and 
the sensitivity of the main fi scal aggregates to such shocks; and the 
foreseeable fi scal space to accommodate them, or to at least spread the 
adjustment to them over time. In all cases, credibility can be enhanced 
by the use of independent “fi scal watchdogs” responsible for assessing 
the correct use of the clause, or at least by a stipulation that the activation 
of the clause must be approved by a qualifi ed majority of Parliament. 
The recent global fi nancial crisis has highlighted the shortcomings of 
fi scal rules that do not include adequate escape clauses. According to 
a survey conducted in 2009 by IMF staff, only about half of countries 
operating under a fi scal rule were able to accommodate a countercyclical 
policy response within the rule’s framework. The others had to either 
explicitly modify the rule, or put it into temporary abeyance. 
ii) While escape clauses are intended to deal with the consequences of
large but temporary shocks, more permanent ones would require a lasting
revision of the rule’s target (or, in some circumstances, even of the
rule’s basis). There would be, in principle, benefi ts from incorporating
ex-ante provisions for such revisions in the legislation introducing a
fi scal rule, not least to avoid reopening political debates on the whole
framework of the rule when the need for such revisions materializes.
In practice, however, it may be diffi cult to anticipate from the outset
the range of factors that may require a revision of the rule.
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iii) The target for the rule could be specifi ed as a range, rather than a point
value. This should be accompanied by a requirement that deviations
from the midpoint of the range, to accommodate a counter-cyclical fi scal
response during  a given phase of the cycle, be recorded in a national
account and be offset by an equivalent deviation in the opposite direction
during the subsequent phase of the cycle. This would avoid the above-
mentioned common asymmetry in active counter-cyclical fi scal policies.
iv) Finally, the target could be specifi ed as a function of the phase of the
cycle, possibly with a threshold value:
Tt= T*+ a*(b*(Yp-Y)/Yp)
where Tt stands for the target at time t; T* for a pre-specifi ed target in 
cyclically neutral conditions; a takes a value of 0 if the output gap falls 
below a pre-specifi ed threshold level, and 1 otherwise; b is a parameter 
between 0 and 1 indicating the desired strength of allowed countercyclical 
responses to the output gap; Yp stands for potential output and Y for 
actual output.2 
III. Mൺංඇ ංඌඌඎൾඌ ංඇ ඍඁൾ ൽൾඌං඀ඇ ඈൿ ඌඍඋඎർඍඎඋൺඅ ൿංඌർൺඅ උඎඅൾඌ
Countries considering the adoption of a SFR face a number of issues 
regarding the choice of the basis of the rule and the level of its target. 
III.a. Choosing  the basis of a SFR
The main choices regarding the basis of a SFR are as follows:
i) To use a cyclically adjusted balance (CAB)3; a growth-based balance
(GBB)4; or a balance over the cycle?5
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2. This formula is suggested in the recently released report of the Advisory Committee for reform of 
the Chilean SFR (Corbo, 2011).
3. A cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) aims to approximate the budget balance that would prevail if 
the economy was operating at its full potential, i.e. if the output gap was zero. Therefore, typically 
it is calculated by excluding from revenues and expenditures those components which are due to
a positive or negative output gap
4. A variant of the CAB is a growth-based balance (GBB), which excludes from budgetary revenues 
and expenditures those components that refl ect the difference between the actual and the trend
growth rate of the economy.
5. A further variant of a CAB-based rule is one that targets a given balance (generally expressed as
a percentage of GDP) over the cycle. Rules of this type were adopted by Sweden and by the UK
during the last decade.
ii) The non interest (primary) or overall balance?
iii) The current or the overall balance?
iv) To adjust for gaps in absorption, rather than output?
v) To adjust for commodity prices fl uctuations?
i) To use a cyclically adjusted balance (CAB); a growth-based balance
(GBB); or a balance over the cycle?
As is well known, obtaining robust estimates of a CAB is not 
an easy task, as all existing methods of estimation of potential output 
(HP and other fi lters; or production functions) suffer from technical 
problems, especially signifi cant in the presence of structural breaks, 
limited observations, and/or frequent signifi cant revision in the GDP 
estimates6. The diffi culties of obtaining reliable estimates of the output 
gap in many LA countries may argue for using an (easier to calculate) 
GBB instead in those countries. However, it should be recognized 
that a GBB can give misleading signals, e.g. during the early phase 
of a recovery, when actual GDP may be growing well above trend 
but still remain below potential. Both a CAB and a GBB require reliable
estimates of elasticities of tax revenues and certain categories of 
expenditures to the cycle. The well-established methodologies (by the 
OECD, IMF, and the EC, among others) to carry out these estimations7  
are relatively demanding in terms of data availability. The alternative 
approach of targeting a given average budget balance over the cycle, 
while in principle equivalent to a CAB-based one, in practice can give 
different results if the length and intensity of the cycle is not correctly 
anticipated at the outset. It is also more prone to political manipulation, 
by e.g. overestimating the length of the downturn phase of the cycle, 
thereby pushing forward in time the required fi scal tightening.
ii) The non interest (primary) or overall balance?
As regards the choice between a primary and an overall balance 
as basis for SFRs, the advantages of the former are that it is more 
controllable by the fi scal authorities and it better refl ects current, rather 
than past, decisions. It also avoids possible incentives for the authorities 
to meet an overall balance target through a loose monetary policy. 
These considerations are especially relevant in most LA countries, 
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6. See e.g. IMF, 2009 and EC, 2010 for details. 
7. See e.g. Girouard and Andre’, 2005; Larch and Turrini, 2009; Fedelino et al., 2009; and EC, 2010.
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given the structure of their public debt (relatively short average maturities, 
and high proportions of instruments with variable rates) which implies 
a quick transmission of volatility in interest rates to the overall budget 
balance. Indeed, most LA countries that already use fi scal rules formulate
them in terms of the (unadjusted) primary balance. However, a primary
balance-based SFR would need to include a debt feedback mechanism, 
to ensure longer term fi scal sustainability in the event of sustained
shocks to interest rates or to the debt stock. A complementary debt 
rule would be useful also when targeting the overall balance, to avoid 
temptations to use below-the-line or quasi-fi scal operations that do not 
affect the budget balance but increase the public debt. Such operations 
are quite common in LA countries. Debt-based rules also have the 
advantage of requiring the fi scal stance to be adjusted in the event 
of a lasting shock, such as a devaluation, impacting the foreign 
exchange-denominated component of the debt. However, they need 
to be formulated carefully, e.g. by including escape clauses that would 
allow such adjustments to be distributed over an adequate period of 
time, to avoid either low quality measures or an outright violation of 
the rule in the event that the shock is unexpected and large.
iii) The current or the overall balance?
As concerns the choice between the current and the overall balance
as basis for a SFR, some have argued in favor of the former, given the 
large infrastructure gaps prevailing in LA8. However, golden-type rules 
do not seem advisable in the region because:
● They may be inconsistent with debt sustainability (still an important
issue in several countries of the region);
● They privilege investment in physical over human capital (lack of
which is still a major constraint to growth in the region);
● They do not provide incentives to improve the systems for evaluation
and selection of public investment program (that are frequently 
poor in LA); and 
● They are open to manipulation through misclassifi cation of spending
programs (a not uncommon practice in the region).  Infrastructure 
spending needs would be better safeguarded through comple-
menting a SFR based on the overall (or primary) balance with 
expenditure rules and/or the use of medium-term expenditure 
frameworks. 
8. See, e.g. Perry et al. 2008.
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9. See Barnett and Vivanco, 2003, for a discussion of statistical properties of oil prices.
iv) To adjust for gaps in absorption, rather than output?
The EC has recently advocated the use of an alternative fi scal 
indicator, i.e. a cyclically and absorption adjusted budget balance (EC, 
2010). Its analysis shows that such an indicator can give signifi cantly
different signals about a fi scal stance than the CAB in countries with 
large current account defi cits. Given the high dependence on consumption 
taxes (more related to absorption than to output) and the volatility of 
external fi nancing in LA countries, in principle it would be desirable to 
adjust the fi scal target for cyclical fl uctuations in absorption, rather than 
output. But, the diffi culties of estimating and especially monitoring CABs 
on a timely basis in most of the region advise against it in practice.
v) To adjust for commodity prices fl uctuations?
Most LA countries are highly dependent on revenues from 
commodities. The high degree of volatility of commodity (especially 
energy products) prices makes the overall fi scal balance of resource 
revenue-dependent countries also very volatile. A rule that would require 
stabilizing the overall balance at a given level over time would result 
in large (and often disruptive) swings in public expenditures; moreover, it 
would be pro-cyclical, as expenditures would rise during boom periods 
and have to be cut back during commodity price slumps, or during 
periods of declining external demand that also have adverse repercussions 
on domestic activity. In contrast, a rule targeting the non-resource 
component of the fi scal balance (possibly adjusted for the domestic 
cycle as well) would smooth spending and avoid pro-cyclicality. 
An alternative approach would be to target the overall balance 
adjusted not only for the output cycle, but also for deviations of the 
prices of main resource revenues from their long-term trend, as is 
done in the Chilean SFR.  In contrast to the one targeting the non 
resource-balance, this approach does not correct for cyclical changes 
in external demand for the relevant commodities, except to the extent 
that they are refl ected in the commodity price swings. It also requires a 
transparent and analytically sound methodology for assessing long-term 
trends in such prices, an especially diffi cult undertaking in the case of 
fuel prices, which many experts view as akin to a random walk.9
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10. Estimated growth rates in 2010 ranged between -1.3 percent in Venezuela to over 8 percent in
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay (IMF WHD REO, Oct. 2010).
11. For example, (i) the permanent income model (PIM) calls for equalization of per capita consumption
across generations, taking into account both resource and non-resource revenues; (ii) the perma-
nent resource income model (PRIM) argues for redistribution of only the resource wealth across
generations; (iii) the so called bird-in-hand rule requires government to limit its non-resource
defi cit to the annual stream of revenues from accumulated fi nancial assets (See Maliszewski,
2009 for a comparison of such rules).
III.b. Choosing an SFR’s target
The choice of the target level under a SFR should be guided by a number 
of considerations:
i) The country’s initial fi scal conditions and its expected medium-term
public debt dynamics
ii) Any long-term savings needs; and
iii) Whether the target is fi xed or variable over time
i) The country’s initial fi scal conditions and its expected medium-term
public debt dynamics
In principle, a fi xed target for the SFR should be set at a level 
that is expected to be consistent with a desired (declining or stationary) 
path of the public debt, under a prudent set of baseline assumptions for 
the relevant macro-economic variables (the growth of trend or potential 
real GDP, infl ation, interest rates, exchange rates, and the probability 
of realization of contingent liabilities). The choice of the baseline 
assumptions should be based on a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, 
and be more cautious the worse the fi scal conditions of the country 
(higher defi cit and debt levels) are at the time of introduction of the 
rule. Particular focus should be placed on analyzing whether actual 
(as opposed to structural) defi cits may occur during the application 
of the rule that could not be fi nanced (or could be only at very high 
interest rates). This analysis requires a careful assessment of the likely 
amplitude of the cycle in the country in question. It also requires reliable 
information on the country’s public and external debt structure, and its 
vulnerability to changes in market sentiment (in particular the likelihood
of sudden stops in capital fl ows). As the charts below show, initial 
conditions vary widely within the LA region, both as concerns budget 
balances and public debt. Financing constraints have eased in most 
countries, but could tighten again in an adverse external scenario. Also, the
 factors infl uencing the debt dynamics, in particular growth and interest 
rates vary signifi cantly across the region12. In many countries, however, 
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Fiscal balances in selected LA countries, 2010
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Chart 2
Gross public debt in selected LA countries, 2010
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the average real cost of the public debt tends to exceed the growth rate, 
pointing to a need to target structural primary surpluses.
ii) Any long-term savings needs
Long term savings needs in the majority of LA countries are 
less related to population aging than is typically the case in advanced 
countries. Most countries in the region have still relatively young 
populations, although some (e.g. Brazil and Uruguay) are aging at a 
faster rate than many industrial countries. In LA countries, the main 
spending needs relate to investment in physical (infrastructure) and 
human capital (education and training) and to improvements in the 
coverage of social safety nets (health, pensions and social assistance). 
Some countries have also sizable contingent liabilities. In countries 
heavily dependent on revenues from non renewable natural resources, 
the choice of medium-term fi scal targets should be guided by the goal 
of accumulating suffi cient wealth to smooth income and consumption 
across generations before and after the exhaustion of the resources. 
However, the translation of this broad principle into operational 
guidelines is far from simple, and different authors have argued for 
different rules.11 One conceptually appealing such rule call for stabilizing 
the non-resource primary balance (as percent of non resource GDP) 
at a level that ensures suffi cient assets accumulation by the time the 
resource wealth is exhausted to allow the same balance to be fi nanced 
subsequently through the return on the assets (Ossowski and Barnett, 
2003). The translation of this principle into an operational rule requires a 
number of diffi cult predictions of such variables as the size and speed 
of depletion of the natural resources, the long term outlook for their 
prices, and the rate of return on the fi nancial wealth being accumulated.12 
iii) Whether the target is fi xed or variable over time
Countries may prefer to specify a time-variant path for their 
SFR target if they need to establish market credibility with a stronger 
up-front adjustment, or if they can credibly project “structural breaks” 
126
12. See Villafuerte et al., 2010 for a discussion of fi scal rules and fi scal policies in LA oil producing
countries.
13. The Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil mandates fi xed ceilings for the public debt and for
government payroll in relation to net revenues, but requires the government to set in the annual
Law on Budget Directives three-year rolling targets (compulsory for the fi rst year and indicative
for the subsequent two) for the (unadjusted) primary balance.
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(related e.g. to the coming on stream of substantial natural resource 
revenues) in their public debt dynamics. In general, however, a rising 
time path for the SFR target would not be advisable, as it is likely to 
be seen by markets as a political expedient to postpone adjustment. 
Finally, countries facing relatively high uncertainty about the relevant 
macro-economic factors may choose to limit the time horizon for the 
specifi cation of the target (to say 3 to 5 years), or to give it a rolling 
character (as is the case e.g. in Brazil13). Of course, the disciplining 
and signaling effect of a rule based on rolling targets would depend 
very much on the demonstrated commitment of the government to 
avoid large year-to-year changes in the targets, and to transparently 
and convincingly motivate them, when unavoidable.
IV. Iආඉඅൾආൾඇඍංඇ඀  SFRඌ ංඇ ඍඁൾ Lൺඍංඇ Aආൾඋංർൺ ർඈඇඍൾඑඍ
Countries considering the adoption of a SFR face a range of issues in 
the implementation of the rule, in particular regarding: 
i) The timing of introduction of the rule;
ii) Its legal basis; and
iii) Its public fi nancial management (PFM) requirements
i) The timing of introduction of the rule
As regards timing, SFRs (like all rules) are unlikely to work if 
introduced in periods of unusual political and economic uncertainty/
turmoil. This is not the case currently in LA. A further consideration in 
favor of the adoption of SFRs in LA at the present time is the current 
phase of the cycle. Clearly, the credibility of a SFR tends to be greater 
if it is adopted during a cyclical expansion. Financial markets and 
other economic agents may view its adoption during a downturn as 
dictated by political expediency (as a SFR would allow a higher level 
of spending than an overall defi cit target), and question its sustainability
under favorable cyclical circumstances. But, as Chile’s experience 
suggests, a country with adequate fi scal space (low debt and low 
probability of emergence of fi nancing constraints) could more easily 
gain market acceptance of its accommodation of the automatic 
stabilizers during a downturn, if at the same time it was committing to 
allowing them to operate during future expansions.
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ii) Its legal basis
A strong legislative basis is not necessarily a pre-condition 
for the introduction of a fi scal rule. A government can in principle 
announce its commitment to the achievement of certain values for 
the targeted fi scal variables for an extended period ahead, without 
seeking to enshrine it into a law. The credibility of such an announcement 
would be of course greater the longer the expected life of the government, 
the stronger the role of the executive in the budget process, and (at 
least in a democratic regime) the broader the perceived political and 
social consensus on the rule. 
That said, a robust legal foundation for a fi scal rule can signif-
icantly enhance the prospects for its effective and sustained observance, 
because it raises the cost of its non-enforcement or abandonment, 
thereby enhancing its credibility. The question is: how robust should 
that foundation be? The higher the level of the law establishing the 
rule, the more diffi cult it is to change it. There is thus a trade-off between 
the objective of strengthening the commitment to the rule, on the one 
hand, and that of preserving an adequate degree of fl exibility, on the 
other hand. While the appropriate balance of these objectives should 
refl ect the specifi c political, institutional, and economic circumstances 
of each country, in practice in most countries fi scal rules are established 
through legal instruments stronger than ordinary laws that could be 
modifi ed by a subsequent budget law. The experience in this respect 
with existing fi scal rules varies across LA. Some countries (e.g. Brazil 
and, since 2006, Chile) have enshrined their fi scal rule in a higher-level 
Fiscal Responsibility Laws. Others use ordinary laws. 
iii) Its public fi nancial management (PFM) requirements
As is well known, sound PFM institutions14 are important for 
an effective conduct of fi scal policy, whether rules-based or not. These 
14. These include, among others: a strong role of the ministry of fi nance in the preparation and imple-
mentation of the budget; adequate capacity in the ministry to forecast revenues and endogenous
components of expenditures; a transparent and comprehensive documentation of proposed budgets; 
a parliamentary budget approval process that limits the scope for amendments inconsistent with
the overall budget stance proposed by the government; effective expenditure control mechanisms 
during the budget execution; comprehensive and fi rmly enforced accounting and reporting require-
ments, capable of generating timely and reliable fi scal statistics; and sound internal and external
auditing procedures.
Tൾඋൾඌൺ Tൾඋ-Mංඇൺඌඌංൺඇ
15. They include extra-budgetary operations; quasi-fi scal operations; provision of guarantees in lieu 
of explicit subsidies or capital transfers to public or private enterprises; unfunded mandates for
sub-national governments, if the coverage of the fi scal rule is limited to the central government; 
and engagement in public-private partnerships (PPPs) not justifi ed by effi ciency considerations.
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requirements are made more stringent by a country’s adoption of 
numerical fi scal rules, because of the reputational and possible other 
costs entailed by a violation of the rule.  Moreover, as mentioned 
above, the adoption of a SFR poses special statistical and computational 
requirements. At the same time, however, the adoption of a rule often
provides impetus for implementing needed reforms in the PFM system, 
as the experience of Chile demonstrates (see sect. VI below). Thus, 
the decision of whether to introduce a fi scal rule requires a careful 
assessment (necessarily country-specifi c) of whether the existing PFM 
system conforms to the minimum requirements for an effective im-
plementation of that rule.
Specifi cally, the preparation of a budget under a SFR requires 
robust estimates of: potential output; the medium-term trend of relevant 
commodity prices; and the elasticities of main revenues and selected 
spending to the cycle and to commodity prices. Several countries in 
LA have suffi ciently developed statistical bases and adequate technical 
capacity to undertake such estimates. Transparency in the methodology 
and assumptions used to calculate structural balances is essential for 
credibility. Delegating the calculations to an independent fi scal watchdog 
could also strengthen credibility and social acceptance of the rule.
Although the adoption of a SFR does not per se require the 
elaboration of a full-fl edged medium-term fi scal framework (MTFF), 
lengthening the time horizon of the budget formulation process can be 
very helpful in promoting effective observance of the rule, particularly
by highlighting trends that, in the absence of corrective action, would 
threaten the achievement of the fi scal targets. At the same time, the 
existence of a rule can facilitate the formulation of a MTFF by providing
more certainty about the medium- term budget balance target. A compre-
hensive and realistic MTFF can also facilitate a more strategic approach 
to priority setting among competing demands for budgetary resources, 
and allow line ministries to plan sectoral policies (and especially 
investment projects) over a longer horizon, with potentially signifi -
cant gains in effi ciency. In LA, a number of governments are current-
ly working on developing or strengthening MTFFs, although in most 
cases signifi cant progress remains to be made in this area.
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Effective controls of the budget execution process are crucial 
for the successful implementation of fi scal rules. So are well-developed, 
transparent and fi rmly enforced budgetary accounting and reporting 
rules. 
Under a SFR, during budget execution, budget managers need 
timely and reliable information on all phases of the expenditure process, 
and on developments affecting the estimates of structural revenues, 
to identify and appropriately react to risks to the observance of 
the structural balance target. They also need, however, to monitor 
developments in actual revenues, to avoid the emergence of fi nancing 
constraints. Most countries in LA have already developed reasonably 
effective controls of the budget execution, supported by modern fi nancial
management information systems (FMIS), at least at the central 
government level.
The importance of sound accounting systems cannot be 
over-emphasized. A number of accounting risks can threaten the 
effective operation of fi scal rules. Some are common to all types of 
rules, and basically relate to the boundaries between the parts of the 
public sector covered and not covered by the rule, and between the 
public and the private sector15. Some of these risks can be mitigated 
if a country’s fi scal responsibility law or organic budget law require 
that various types of contingent liabilities be disclosed, quantifi ed 
to the extent possible, and adequately provisioned for in the budget. 
Other accounting risks are more specifi c to certain types of rules, 
e.g. the overestimation of potential GDP growth under a SFR; the 
above-mentioned misclassifi cation of current expenditures as capital 
ones under a golden rule; resort to tax expenditures, in lieu of subsidies
and transfers, under an expenditure rule; and the accumulation of 
liabilities (e.g. to suppliers) not recorded in the debt statistics, under 
a debt rule. Effectively containing these risks is a diffi cult task, requiring
not only the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive and 
detailed accounting regulations, with appropriate penalties for non 
compliance for the responsible offi cials, but also adequate external 
scrutiny through an independent Audit Court, or an external watch-
dog/fi scal council.
Finally, a transparent and timely reporting of the accounting 
information is also important for the effective implementation of fi scal 
Tൾඋൾඌൺ Tൾඋ-Mංඇൺඌඌංൺඇ
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rules. This is needed to facilitate both corrective action by the government,
 when needed, and the external scrutiny mentioned above. The reporting
should be suffi ciently detailed to allow interested outside observers 
to assess not only past compliance with the rule, but also the risks of 
future non-compliance. 
The quality of accounting and reporting systems has improved 
signifi cantly in recent decades in LA, often with the assistance of 
international organizations and MDBs. Nevertheless, some of the 
accounting risks mentioned above remain quite pervasive, and there 
has been some regress in the more recent years towards non transparent
or heterodox accounting practices in several countries, including 
some like Brazil that had been previously viewed as models of sound 
budgetary accounting. The effectiveness of a newly introduced SFR 
in these countries would hinge crucially on eschewing such practices 
in the future.
V. Sඍඋඎർඍඎඋൺඅ ൿංඌർൺඅ උඎඅൾඌ ൿඈඋ ඌඎൻ-ඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ ඀ඈඏൾඋඇආൾඇඍඌ ංඇ 
Lൺඍංඇ Aආൾඋංർൺ?
The extent of fi scal decentralization and its potential impact on macro-
economic management vary signifi cantly across LA. Specifi cally:
● In a number of unitary countries (e.g. Chile, Uruguay, and the central 
American countries) decentralization is still limited, and does 
not pose signifi cant macro-economic risks. In Bolivia, Mexico,
and Peru, growing decentralization has not signifi cantly affected
fi scal sustainability so far, due to relatively tight limits on sub-
national borrowing. In Brazil and Colombia, substantial progress
has been made since the mid-1990s in tightening controls
on sub-national debt and reducing it. Progress has also been 
made in reducing sub-national debt in Argentina, mainly as a 
result of bailouts by the federal government, as well as of the 
buoyancy of the provinces’ own and shared revenues. 
● In most countries, however, sub-national fi scal responses to shocks
have tended to be pro-cyclical, albeit less so in the more 
recent years. Pro-cyclicality has refl ected (to different degrees in 
different countries) a mix of factors:
- Fiscal rules or other borrowing controls with targets unrelated to 
the cycle; and even in the absence of such rules, pro-cyclical 
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fl uctuations in the availability of fi nancing for most sub-national 
governments (SNGs) throughout the region;
- The lack of signifi cant sub-national revenue-raising autonomy in 
most coutries (with the exceptions of Brazil, and to a lesser 
extent, Argentina) especially at the state/regional level, which 
has severely constrained the scope to sustain sub-national 
spending during recessions;
- The (full or partial) assignment to SNGs of some highly cyclical 
revenues, especially from non-renewable resources, in some 
countries (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru);
- Inter-governmental transfer systems based on revenue-sharing for-
mulas invariant over the cycle, which propagate quickly to the 
sub-national fi nances cyclical fl uctuations in the central gov-
ernment’s (CG) revenues (Colombia being an exception in this 
respect16); and fi nally
- Pervasive rigidities (including earmarking of revenues and/ or trans-
fers to certain categories of expenditure) which reduce the 
scope for reassignment of sub-national resources to changing 
expenditure needs/priorities over the cycle.
These considerations point to a number of possible options for reforms 
in the inter-governmental systems of the region that could facilitate less pro-cyclical 
sub-national fi scal policies, while safeguarding debt sustainability, in the future.
In particular, specifying sub-national rules in terms of cyclically ad-
justed budget balances should in principle help avoid pro-cyclicality, while 
safeguarding fi scal sustainability (provided of course that the rules’ targets 
are chosen on the basis of appropriately cautious debt dynamics scenarios). 
There are, however, a number of factors that would limit the effectiveness of 
such an approach in practice, and even advise against its adoption in some 
circumstances:
● First, the diffi culties of estimating cyclically adjusted fi scal aggregates 
are even more signifi cant at the sub-national than at the national 
level. Most countries do not have reliable and timely estimates 
of regional or local output, even less of output gaps. Using 
national indicators of the cycle as a proxy can be appropriate 
when the cyclical shocks are evenly distributed across the national 
territory, but, as evidenced by the recent global fi nancial crisis, 
Tൾඋൾඌൺ Tൾඋ-Mංඇൺඌඌංൺඇ
16. A transfer reform in Colombia in 2001 stipulated that CG transfers to SNGs would grow at a fi xed 
annual real rate until 2016
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this is not always the case. An alternative approach might be to 
use changes in labor market indicators (such as the unemployment
rate, for which timely sub-national-level measures are generally 
available) as triggers for allowing deviations from the fi scal 
rule’s target up to a pre-specifi ed limit. However, this ap-
proach is clearly more suitable for advanced countries, char-
acterized by high degrees of labor market formality, than for 
the LA countries, where labor market adjustments to cyclical 
shocks mainly occur in the informal sector and therefore are 
inadequately captured by changes in the offi cial unemployment 
statistics. Moreover, such an approach would be more effective 
in avoiding a pro-cyclical fi scal tightening during a large negative 
output shock, than in avoiding a pro-cyclical fi scal expansion 
by resource-rich regions during a commodity price boom. 
For the latter, an alternative approach would be to require 
adjustments of the target balance for deviations in commodity 
prices from their medium-term trend. Given, however, the 
above-mentioned diffi culties of obtaining reliable estimates of 
the medium term trend of commodity (especially oil) prices, it 
may be preferable to utilize sub-national rules that target the 
budget balance excluding resource revenues.
●  Second, fi nancing constraints tend to be tighter at the sub-national
 than at the national level, as market access is typically lower 
and more expensive for SNGs than for their corresponding 
CG. This suggests that the use of a sub-national fi scal rule 
allowing cycle-related deviations from a balanced-budget (or 
other sustainable balance) target should be accompanied by 
a requirement that SNGs use their budget surpluses during 
booms to accumulate liquid assets to be drawn down during 
downturns. This is for example the case in the US, where a 
number of state constitutions require the accumulation of 
so-called rainy day funds (Balassone et al., 2006). It is crucial 
that arrangements for the governance of such funds be very trans-
parent, and that their use be guided by clear criteria, specifi ed
in advance of the crisis, leaving little room for discretion, for 
example in the decision to start drawing on the fund, and the 
speed of its rundown.
● Third, consideration should be given to increased use of expenditure 
rules at the sub-national level. Such rules, while not necessarily
avoiding pro-cyclicality during downturns (since they set ceilings,
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not fl oors, for public expenditures) help moderate it during 
upswings and, by promoting sub-national savings and asset 
accumulation during such periods, can help cushion the impact 
of subsequent recessions on spending.
● Fourth, broader reforms are likely to be needed in the system of 
inter-governmental fi scal arrangements, to effectively reduce 
the risk of pro-cyclicality at the sub-national level. In particular,
one criterion for the choice of revenues to be assigned to SNGs 
should be a low elasticity to cyclical developments. This (as 
well as equity considerations) argues against the assignment of 
revenues from natural resources and from company taxes to the 
sub-national level, as well as against a derivation-based revenue
sharing mechanism for such revenues . As regards other shared
revenues, it may be desirable to use a sharing formula based on 
moving averages, rather than current values, of CG revenues,
to help smooth cyclical fl uctuations of SNGs’ resources.
Consideration could also be given to the use of automatic triggers
for pre-specifi ed changes in sharing formulas (symmetric over
the cycle) when cyclical indicators reach certain threshold
values. Finally, it would be preferable not to devolve to the sub-
national level certain expenditures (such as unemployment 
benefi ts) that are both cyclically and socially sensitive (or at least 
their funding). 
●  More generally, CGs that want to ensure that their own (passive 
or active) counter-cyclical fi scal policies are not frustrated 
by pro-cyclical policies of their SNGs should endeavor to: 
strengthen the institutional arrangements for policy coordination
with the latter; provide incentives (sticks and carrots) to them 
to build up adequate fi nancial cushions during boom periods to 
withstand  subsequent downturns; and help them improve their 
capacity to implement CG-funded stimulus measures (whether 
in the social or the infrastructure area) when needed.
VI. Sൾඅൾർඍൾൽ ർඈඎඇඍඋඒ ൾඑඉൾඋංൾඇർൾඌ 
VI.a. Chile
Chile’s 10 year experience with a structural budget balance-based 
rule provides a useful illustration of both the advantages of such a rule, 
and the relatively demanding pre-conditions for its successful design and 
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implementation. 
The rule was adopted in May 2000, at the outset of a new presidential 
mandate. It called for the achievement of an annual surplus equivalent to 1 
percent of GDP in the budget, adjusted for the effects of both the cycle and 
deviations of the price of copper from its long term trend on revenues. All 
the variables and parameters used in the calculation of the structural balance 
were initially estimated by the Ministry of Finance, but within a year or so, 
with a view to strengthening the credibility of the estimates, the government 
appointed panels of independent experts to vet them. 
The methodology of calculation of the structural balance was revised 
on several occasions in the subsequent years. Some of the changes represented
useful refi nements (e.g. the exclusion of deviations of actual from trend prices 
of molybdenum, a signifi cant and volatile source of revenue for the state-owned 
mining company, CODELCO; a disaggregation of total revenues into main 
categories, and the estimation of the related elasticities; a separate treatment
of tax revenues from private copper mining enterprises; and the exclusion of 
expenditures of a newly created unemployment fund). However, other changes 
(such as the inclusion in revenues “above the line” of valuation changes in the 
fi nancial assets of the Pension and Economic and Social Stabilization Funds; 
and the classifi cation “below the line” of some expenditures to support certain 
public enterprises) were less defensible. 
The choice of the initial target (a 1 percent of GDP structural surplus), 
despite a low level of the public debt, was justifi ed by a number of considerations,
related in particular to: the existence of a signifi cant quasi-fi scal defi cit of 
the Central Bank; the desire to accumulate fi nancial assets, as counterpart to 
the ongoing gradual depletion of copper resources; and concern about various 
known or contingent future liabilities.  In 2008, the government decided to revise 
downward the target (to 0.5 percent of GDP), in line with the recommendations 
of a panel of experts which had highlighted the signifi cant improvement in the 
fi scal position since the introduction of the rule, following the recapitalization 
of the Central Bank and a decline in contingent liabilities. This revision was 
effected in a transparent and well explained manner, with no adverse repercussions
 on the credibility of the fi scal management of the country. In contrast, neither the 
rationale for, nor the planned duration of, a subsequent reduction of the structural
surplus target to 0 in early 2009 -in conjunction with the announcement
of a substantial (around 4 percent of GDP) fi scal stimulus package— were 
spelled out by the government, raising some concern about the future of the rule.
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The adoption of the structural rule in Chile gave impulse to a number 
of institutional reforms, which have improved the statistical base to monitor 
government operations (with the adoption in 2004 of the GFS 2001 Manual, 
and of accrual accounting), as well as the quality of the budget process. 
In particular, the commitment to a multi-year budget target facilitated a more 
top-down approach to the defi nition of overall and ministry-by-ministry 
spending ceilings, in combination with increased freedom and responsibility 
of budget managers in the allocation of the resources allotted to them. These 
changes are in line with modern best practices in budgeting and an essential 
pre-condition for a more performance-oriented public fi nancial management. 
Various analyses have found evidence that the rule also contributed signifi cantly
to reducing spending volatility in Chile, and had benefi cial macroeconomic 
effects, in terms of reduced output volatility and sovereign risk.
In view of Chile’s success in the implementation of its SFR, an obvious 
question is what were the main factors responsible for the success, and to what 
extent they can be replicated in other countries considering a Chilean-type 
rule. Clearly, Chile had a number of conditions in place at the outset of the rule 
that boded well for its success:
●  A fairly diversifi ed productive base, and substantial trade openness;
●  Relatively fl exible monetary and exchange rate policies, and a fi nancial
sector that had already undergone substantial restructuring and 
consolidation; 
●  An extended record of sound macro-fi scal management, as evidenced 
by the very low level of its public debt;
●  A modern and broad-based tax system and a strong tax administration. 
Revenues from natural resources accounted for less than 10 
percent of total; 
●  A long tradition of top-down, disciplined budget management, and 
a relatively centralized system of intergovernmental fi scal 
relations; and
●  A well-developed statistical base that facilitated the preparation of 
credible estimates of the structural budget balance, the timely 
monitoring of their realization, and a transparent dissemination 
of the relevant information.
Nevertheless, as indicated above, the authorities took a number of steps 
to strengthen the institutional base of the rule, while selecting an initial structural
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target that was probably more ambitious than would have been required to 
ensure both short-term macro stability and medium term debt sustainability. 
This prudent course of action contributed signifi cantly to the success of an 
approach which, while already common in a number of advanced countries, 
had few precedents among emerging markets, and none at all in LA. 
The SFR came under some stress during the global fi nancial crisis of 
2008-09 that hit Chile quite hard. Given the absence of an escape clause in 
the rule, the government’s decision to support the economy through a large (4 
percent of GDP) fi scal stimulus package (well justifi ed, given Chile’s strong 
fi scal sustainability indicators) inevitably required a violation of the rule in 
both 2009 and 2010. The new government that took offi ce in 2010 decided 
to appoint a Commission of experts to carry out a comprehensive review of 
the rule and recommend any needed revision. The Commission’s report was 
released in June 2011. Its main recommendations include: 
●  Improvements in the  methodology of estimation of some of the 
rule’s parameters
●  Relating the choice of the target to the cyclical position
●  Inclusion of escape clauses; and
●  The creation of a fi scal watchdog.
The government has not yet reacted offi cially to the Committee’s recom-
mendations.
VI.b. Colombia
Among LA countries where the introduction of a SFR is currently under
consideration, Colombia has made the most progress to date, by formulating 
a new fi scal responsibility law that includes a SFR, approved by the Congress 
in June 2011. 
The law establishes the framework for the rule, leaving signifi cant details
 to future regulations. Specifi cally, it establishes a ceiling of 1.5% of GDP for 
the overall structural defi cit of the central government.17 The budget balance 
is adjusted for the output gap and for a (not further specifi ed) transitory compo-
nent of revenues from non-renewable resources. A transition period to 2015 is 
proposed for convergence of the structural defi cit to the target.
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The law allows for a temporary deviation from the structural target 
in case of a shortfall of actual from potential growth, to accommodate active 
fi scal stimulus of up to 25% of the gap. Excesses over the target have to be 
corrected within two years, but there are no penalties for non-observance of 
the rule. The law includes (rather broadly defi ned) escape clauses, giving to 
the Government the power to invoke them. It also proposes various changes in 
the budget process, to facilitate implementation of the rule. Among them is 
the creation of a Saving and Stabilization Fund and of a mechanism (Bolsa 
Concursable para el Gasto Nuevo) to allocate the “fi scal space“ available under 
the rule for new spending programs. This is modeled on a similar mechanism 
used in Chile. The law does not envisage the creation of a fi scal watchdog, but 
it requires the setting up of an independent expert panel to provide inputs into 
the estimation of the structural balance.
VI.c. Brazil
 
Following decades during which endemic weaknesses and inadequate 
control of the public fi nances contributed importantly to macro-economic 
instability in Brazil, the country embarked in the late 1990s on a sustained fi scal
adjustment, marked by high and rising primary surpluses of the consolidated
public sector. The adjustment refl ected strengthened policies; institutional 
improvements; and, especially since the mid-2000s, the benefi cial effects 
on the public fi nances of a favorable external environment (strong external 
demand, high commodity prices and low international interest rates) and of 
increased domestic policy credibility. The resulting moderation in the public 
debt and the improvement in its structure allowed a strongly countercyclical 
response to the downturn in activity in the wake of the global fi nancial crisis 
of 2008-2009, in sharp contrast with the typically pro-cyclical fi scal responses 
to crises in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, the Brazilian economy emerged 
from the downturn with remarkable speed and relatively small economic and 
social costs.
Fiscal policy has remained, however, strongly expansionary during 
the subsequent cyclical upswing, fueling an unsustainable pace of domestic 
demand growth, a pick-up of infl ationary pressures and a signifi cant dete-
rioration of the external current account in 2010. Arresting and ultimately 
reversing these trends has become an important short-term imperative for 
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17.As mentioned in sect V above, sub-national governments in Colombia are subject to relatively 
strict (not cyclically adjusted) borrowing limits.
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macroeconomic, and in particular fi scal policy in Brazil. The adoption of 
a SFR could contribute to a more cyclically neutral (and ultimately more 
sustainable) conduct of fi scal policies in the future. 
Brazil meets in principle the main pre-conditions for establishment of 
a SFR, at least for the federal government:
●   No signifi cant short-term fi nancing constraints, and sustainable debt 
dynamics under a range of plausible scenarios
●  Flexible exchange rate and monetary policy frameworks
●  A relatively strong budget framework (albeit marred recently by 
increasing resort to quasi-fi scal operations18) and sound PFM 
systems
●  A well-developed statistical base, and strong technical capacity within
and outside the government.
The adoption of a numerical rule, as opposed to the current rolling 
three year fi scal framework, would strengthen fi scal discipline and increase 
pressures to address major structural fi scal reform needs in Brazil. But, to be 
effective, such a rule would require strong political support, the existence of 
which is unclear at present. Therefore, it may be preferable for the authorities 
to begin by systematically calculating and reporting cyclically adjusted fi scal 
indicators, to inform the choice of the primary balance targets over the cycle.
This approach could be complemented by a number of other institu-
tional reforms to strengthen fi scal management in the years ahead:
● The announcement by the government of its commitment to declining 
target paths for both the gross and the net public debt over the 
medium term, and to primary surplus targets consistent ex-ante 
with such paths, with a simultaneous commitment to revisit 
each year (and adjust as needed) the primary surplus targets to 
ensure compliance with the debt targets. This would represent a 
strong signal of commitment to medium-term fi scal sustainability.
● A clarifi cation in the budget document of the nature and amount of 
quasi-fi scal operations (such as funding of fi nancial and non 
18. In recent years, the coverage of the target variable (the primary surplus of the consolidated public 
sector) has been reduced through the exclusion of some key public enterprises and of a progressively 
expanding set of budgetary investments. Also, the meaningfulness of the primary balance as an 
indicator of the fi scal policy stance has been weakened by a signifi cant use of one-off revenues 
and quasi-fi scal operations.
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fi nancial public enterprises not included in the budget; and 
private-public partnerships), with a systematic and transparent 
analysis of their future costs and risks for the public fi nances
● Refraining from (or at a minimum transparently disclosing) one-off 
revenues and/or anticipations of receipts and delays in expenditures
that distort the assessment of the budget stance 
● The early passage of the proposed new organic budget law (Lei de 
Responsabilidade Orçamentária) which has been pending in 
Congress for over two years, and which would signifi cantly 
strengthen and modernize the  budget process; and
● The creation of an independent fi scal council/watchdog responsible 
for vetting budgetary projections and publicly reporting on a 
timely basis on the consistency of budgetary developments 
with the fi scal targets.
VII. Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇඌ
This paper has argued that, given LA’s historical tendency towards pro-
cyclical fi scal policies, the adoption of well designed and fi rmly implemented
SFRs could in principle help reduce fi scal pro-cyclicality and promote 
sustainability in the region. This is supported by the fact that an important 
determinant of past pro-cyclicality (the emergence of tight fi nancing constraints
during adverse external shocks) has been signifi cantly reduced (although 
probably not eliminated). Chile’s broadly successful experience with a SFR 
witnesses to the benefi ts of such an approach.
However, the paper has also argued that there are several important 
prerequisites for the effective adoption and implementation of SFRs:
● First and foremost, a strong political commitment to the observance 
of the rule;
● A reasonably stable macro-economic environment, especially at the 
outset of the rule;
● A minimum set of PFM requirements, in terms of capacity to: formulate
reliable budgetary projections; monitor the execution of the 
approved budget and respond on a timely bases to developments 
threatening the achievement of the rule’s target; and appropriately 
account, and transparently report on the budget execution;
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● Reliable and timely fi scal statistics, and the capacity to obtain robust 
estimates of the relevant variables (potential output; trend 
commodity prices; and budgetary elasticities);
● Adequate external scrutiny, not only ex-post (through the traditional 
audit institutions), but preferably also throughout the budgetary 
process, through independent fi scal watchdogs; and
● Appropriate enforcement mechanisms, including requirements of 
timely correction of deviations of budget outcomes from the 
target.
While several LA countries already broadly meet the main technical 
requirements for the adoption of a SFR, it is unclear at this time how many of 
them have the necessary political commitment to make a SFR (or for that matter 
any numerical fi scal rule) work effectively. It is encouraging that Colombia 
has recently adopted a fi scal responsibility law including a SFR, although 
with a number of important details still to be fl eshed out; and that reportedly 
countries like Brazil, Peru and Uruguay are actively considering the adoption 
of a SFR. In these and other countries of the region, it may be appropriate 
for the authorities to begin calculating and utilizing systematically structural 
fi scal balances as indicators of the fi scal stance, to inform the choice of the 
annual or medium-term budget targets, before moving to enshrine them in a 
fi scal rule. Some countries could also benefi t from shadowing a SFR before 
adopting it formally (as Chile did during part of the 1990s). This would allow 
refi ning the technical aspects of the approach and strengthening the relevant 
institutions, before committing the credibility of fi scal policies to the observance 
of a formal rule’s target.                                                    
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